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Until recently,  international trade has taken a back seat to issues
of unemployment,  inflation  and the  budget  deficit.  Now,  however,
with the trade deficit almost  as large as the budget deficit,  opinion
polls show that the U.S. public is beginning to see trade as an impor-
tant concern.
Trade has been one of the primary interests of the Reagan adminis-
tration. The policies and programs resulting from this focus reflect a
strong commitment to free trade.
Basically,  the  administration  believes  that  free  trade  produces
more jobs, more  income,  more production  and a higher  standard  of
living for  all. It accomplishes  this through the process  of increased
competition,  and that often  makes us think there must be winners
and losers. But that depends on your time frame. In the long run, all
contestants in an open trading system are winners.  In the words of
John Stuart Mill:  "The benefit of international  trade is a more  effi-
cient employment of the productive  forces of the world."
President Reagan recently issued a statement on agricultural trade
noting,  "It  has become  clear that ultimately  no  one  benefits  from
the  current  policies  employed  around  the  world-not  farmers,  not
consumers  and not the taxpayers.  It is equally  clear  no nation can
unilaterally  abandon  current  policies  without  being devastated  by
policies of other countries. The only hope is for a major international
agreement  that  commits  everyone  to  the  same  actions  and  time-
table"(Reagan).
This philosophy has guided U.S. actions over the years.  And, while
the world has not always agreed with us, history does show orderly, if
slow, progress toward the realization that trade barriers of any sort
undermine national  interests and erode the potential to produce.
This philosophy also has led to the U.S. proposal for world agricul-
tural  trade  reform  made  before  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) on July 6,  1987, in Geneva, Switzerland.
92A little background  on the GATT and what has led to the current
round of negotiations  may be useful.
The GATT
The GATT is a multilateral agreement that lays down rules govern-
ing the trade relations between member countries. It also functions
as the principal international body concerned with reducing or elimi-
nating trade barriers. It does so through the sponsorship  of interna-
tional rounds of trade negotiations.
Since its inception, seven major rounds of negotiations have taken
place under GATT auspices: in Geneva in 1948; in Annecy, France, in
1949;  in Torquay,  England,  in  1951;  in Geneva in 1956;  in  Geneva
(the "Dillon Round")  in 1960-61;  in Geneva  (the "Kennedy  Round")
in 1964-67;  and,  finally, the "Tokyo  Round"  which  began in Tokyo,
Japan, in 1973 and ended in 1979.
As a result of these past rounds of trade negotiations, tariff rates on
thousands  of items entering world commerce  have been  reduced  or
bound against  increase.
The Kennedy  Round alone reduced  the average  level of world in-
dustrial tariffs by one-third.  These reductions affected a high propor-
tion of the total trade of GATT countries and, indirectly, the trade of
many nonmembers.  These reductions also contributed greatly to the
immense growth in world trade since 1948.
In the 1970s, the Tokyo Round negotiations  attempted to  remove
both tariff and nontariff obstacles to trade on a whole range of indus-
trial and agricultural  products,  including tropical products and raw
material, whether in primary form or at any stage of processing.
The  United  States has  consistently  supported  the concept  of im-
proved  trading  rules  for  guiding  trade  transactions  even  though
trade is relatively less important to us than to our trading partners.
While U.S.  gross  national product  (GNP) is 23 percent  of the world
economy, we only account for 10 percent of world trade.  U.S. exports
are about 7 percent of U.S.  GNP versus  32 percent for Germany,  29
percent for the United Kingdom and Canada, 25 percent for Italy, 24
percent for France,  16  percent for Japan and Australia and  13 per-
cent for Brazil.
Nevertheless,  the  United States continues  to support further  im-
provements in the GATT as the most logical means of, in John Stuart
Mill's words again, gaining "a more efficient employment of the pro-
ductive forces of the world."
The Uruguay Round
We are now standing at the beginning of another round of multila-
teral negotiations. This, the Uruguay Round, launched on September
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resolve international trade problems.  It is an opportunity we may not
have again in the foreseeable  future.
U.S. Trade Representative  Clayton Yeutter recently  observed:
One of the major shortcomings of the GATT during its 40-year
existence is that it has never effectively confronted agricultural
trade policy problems.  It has done a reasonably good job in the
industrial  area over  the past four decades,  but very little has
happened  to  provide  any  discipline  over the way  agricultural
trade is conducted (Yeutter and Lyng).
The United  States approach has been to place every type of trade
restriction  on the table.  The fundamental  fact  for  most basic  com-
modities  is that  domestic  systems of support and protection  inhibit
growth in demand, stimulate excess production, and, in so doing, pro-
voke more frequent use of import restrictions and export subsidies.
This administration is convinced the time has come for an interna-
tional  approach  to  removing  the  domestic  systems  that  restrict
growth  in  world  agricultural  trade.  That  simple  idea  has taken  a
long time to gain acceptance.  Better late than never.  The statement
issued  in Paris at the  conclusion  of the ministerial  meeting  of the
Organization  of  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)
was the  consensus  for which  we  have  long  hoped  (Organization  of
Economic Cooperation  and Development). The section on agriculture,
agreed  to by all  the industrialized  countries,  recognizes  that  long-
term reform of domestic  programs is essential and declares that the
Uruguay Round should establish the framework in which this reform
can take place.
In keeping with  that sentiment,  on  July 6,  1987,  in Geneva,  the
United States submitted its formal proposal for the reform of agricul-
tural trade under the  GATT.
The proposal  is easy to describe but sweeping in  concept.  We  are
seeking the elimination  of all direct  and indirect  subsidies and all
import barriers that affect agricultural trade. We have proposed that
these  subsidies  and  restrictions  be  phased  out  over  the  next  ten
years.
We are not proposing a simple swapping of tariff cuts or other con-
cessions,  product  by  product.  We  are  linking  subsidies  and  access
barriers together in order to phase out whole systems of excess sup-
port and protection.  Only by eliminating the source  of the problem
can we end the creation of price-depressing surpluses and put compe-
tition back on an even playing field.
Our proposal does include a safety net for those farmers who need
help  making  the  shift  to  a  market-oriented  world  agriculture.
Farmers unable to compete could  receive  help in the  form of direct
income  supports.  Such  direct  help would  prevent them  from  being
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aid to greater farm production.  With overproduction  already one  of
the biggest problems facing world agriculture, it is hardly helpful to
producers  to support  income through  price  guarantees  or  other de-
vices that encourage them to produce  even more.
Our proposal to the GATT also seeks an internationally  agreed on
approach  to assure that the development  and application  of health
and sanitary regulations are based on scientifically  verifiable  needs
and not  for  the purpose  of trade  restrictions.  Individual  countries
now  have their own  health  and  sanitary regulations.  Commodities
produced  and exported under strict health standards in one country
must  conform  to  different  regulations  in  importing  nations,  thus
complicating  trade.  Standardizing  health and sanitary rules world-
wide would help facilitate flow  of trade.
Ambassador  Clayton  Yeutter called the U.S.  proposal  a quantum
leap forward  in the  conduct  of agricultural  trade  and  a  quantum
leap forward in the disciplines that will  exist throughout the world
(Yeutter  and Lyng).  He went  on to say that everybody  will have to
go  down the reform  road  together;  trade reform  cannot  be  accom-
plished unilaterally.
Bilateral Issues
While  reform  through  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations  shows
much promise,  it is not the only avenue  for resolving trade difficul-
ties. Even as we are working in the GATT to bring about broad, long-
term changes in the world trading system, we also are continuing to
negotiate  bilaterally  with  other  countries,  such  as  the  European
Community (EC) and Japan.
Our  ongoing talks  with the EC,  for example,  provide  a  forum to
discuss pressing policy  issues.
In the past year,  we have addressed  and successfully  concluded  an
agreement  on EC compensation to the United States for trade losses
stemming from  Spain's  and Portugal's joining the EC last year.  We
expect, and will insist, that the EC live up to its commitments in this
agreement.
We  have also satisfactorily  settled the  "citrus-pasta"  dispute.  But
we still have a number of contentious issues pending, among them a
proposed  EC tax on consumption  of vegetable  oils and the EC's re-
strictions on meat imports from third countries. We  are greatly con-
cerned about the implications of these issues for our oilseed and meat
trade.
Certainly  much work remains to be done in the EC where  govern-
ment policies  are impeding the natural processes of adjustment to a
global  agriculture.
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or inefficient industries,  wages that are unresponsive to the market
and social  policies that impede  growth.  These help  account for Eu-
rope's inability  to adjust  quickly  to  changing  economic  conditions
and for a persistently  high unemployment rate  now averaging more
than  11 percent in the EC. In contrast,  the U.S.  rate is less than 7
percent and the U.S. economy has created  11 million new jobs since
1982.
Regarding  Japan,  which  ranks  as  the  biggest  market  for  U.S.
agriculture,  Allen Wallis,  under secretary  of state  for economic  and
agricultural affairs, has said:
Japan's success as an exporter has created the appearance  of a
miraculously  efficient  economy.  Notwithstanding that popular
view,  much  of Japan's  economy  is  still  quite  backward.  The
complications  of the distribution system are legendary and its
intricate web of obstacles to imports is a serious obstacle  to its
own full prosperity.
With small plots and many part-time  farmers, Japan's agricul-
tural sector is one of the least efficient and most heavily subsi-
dized  of  any  major  industrialized  country.  This  support,
combined  with the  tax treatment  of capital  gains,  limits  the
land available  for residential purposes  and generates  a ripple
effect throughout the Japanese economy. It contributes to weak-
ness in the consumer  goods market and in imports.  It particu-
larly limits agricultural imports, though in spite of that Japan
is the largest buyer of U.S. agricultural products (Wallis).
Wallis  added that structural  adjustment  is now  a key element  of
U.S.  economic  policy  in relation  to  Japan  and  "complements  our
other  efforts  to  secure  greater  internationalization,  deregulation,
freedom and openness throughout the Japanese economy. We hope to
see Japan becoming an importing  superpower, not just an exporting
superpower."
U.S.-Canadian  Talks
I  would  like  to  turn your  attention  to  the  U.S.-Canadian  trade
talks.  Both  our  countries  are  working  hard  for  a  U.S.-Canadian
agreement  that would open up trade  along our mutual border-the
longest border  anywhere  in the world that is open, unguarded  and
friendly.  A lot of trade already crosses that border-and  it is in the
interest of both countries to expand that trade further.
Negotiations-even  agreements-between  the  United  States  and
Canada  on  free trade date back  more than one hundred years.  The
first  move  in this  direction  came in  1854  when  our two  countries
signed an agreement that permitted each to fish in the other's waters
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twelve years but was  not renewed  following British support for the
Confederacy in the 1860s.
Another major  effort  at freer trade between  the two nations  was
made  in  1911  when  we  negotiated  a  reciprocity  agreement  that
would  have  introduced  free trade for  agricultural  products  and re-
duced tariffs on manufactured  products.  That agreement  was never
ratified by Canada because of concerns, stemming from U.S. political
rhetoric,  that  the free  trade  might have  only been  a first step  in
eventual annexation  of Canada.
During the  mid-1930's,  the United States and Canada  negotiated
an agreement  that reduced  U.S. tariffs  on Canadian goods  imposed
during the Depression under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff rules. The pact
was renewed in 1938 but it was superseded in 1948 when both coun-
tries participated in the multilateral  GATT.
At the present time, only one major bilateral economic accord-the
1965 treaty creating a duty-free market for automobiles and parts-
is in effect between the two countries.
The current talks are the first in nearly  forty years in which the
United States and Canada  have  addressed the issue  of freer trade.
They  are the result of a summit  meeting  two years  ago in March,
1985,  between President Ronald Reagan  and Prime Minister  Brian
Mulroney.
The  U.S.  Congress  has  authorized  the  Reagan  administration to
pursue these negotiations  on a "fast track"  basis. However,  this au-
thority expires at the end of 1987. To meet the deadline, U.S. negotia-
tors need to submit whatever they have come up with to Congress by
early October.  This means the negotiations have been conducted un-
der great time pressure.
On  the  agriculture  side,  we  have  held  meetings  at least  once  a
month since July, 1986. More recently, the meetings have been more
like once  every  other week. We  have focused  much attention on the
harmonization  of health and sanitary regulations.  A task force with
representatives  from  both governments  was formed to  discuss this
topic and I believe we have made some headway.
We have  also undertaken to identify the various agricultural sub-
sidy  programs  -at  the  federal  as well  as the  state and provincial
levels-that distort agricultural trade between our two countries.
The  subsidy  question is one  of the more contentious issues being
addressed.  In Canada,  Secretary for External Affairs Joe Clark has
blamed both EC and U.S.  subsidies for "devastating"  the livelihood
of Canadian farmers.  He says that, "Agricultural  production in Eu-
rope  is subsidized to  an extent  that defies all  economic  sense.  The
United  States finally  responded  to  this  structural  distortion  with
equally absurd export subsidies of its own"  (Davies).
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issue is not entirely one-sided. Last December the Canadian govern-
ment authorized $1 billion in Canadian dollars for the special  Cana-
dian Grains Program to use as a subsidy for the country's grain and
oilseed producers.  That is certainly  a step in the wrong direction as
far as our free trade talks are concerned.
As  part  of the  free  trade  talks,  we  also have  formed  a  working
group on access issues. This group is concentrating on nontariff bar-
riers such  as various  U.S.  import restrictions  and Canadian provin-
cial  wine  regulations  and  marketing  board  import  licensing
requirements.
The  wine  and  beer  access  problem  exemplifies  how  a  nontariff
trade barrier can  be every bit as damaging as a tariff. Under Cana-
dian  law,  complete  control  over  sales  and  distribution  of alcoholic
beverages  is given  to  the provinces.  Although  Canada is currently
the  largest market  for  U.S.  wines,  discriminatory  price  mark-ups,
lack of listing opportunities and restrictive provincial marketing and
distribution practices  are  serious impediments  to expansion  of U.S.
wine exports.
With respect to beer,  U.S.  brewers have had little or no success  in
obtaining provincial liquor board listings allowing them to sell their
products in Canada. However,  in most provinces beer produced there
may be sold outside of the provincial liquor board system. That gives
domestic  production  a  large  advantage  over  imported  beer.  As  a
result, U.S. brewers have had to license Canadian brewers to produce
U.S.  brands.  This  at  a time  when  Canadian  beer  exporters  have
ready access to a large U.S. market.
Will  U.S.  and Canadian  negotiators  be  able to come  up  with an
agreement  by the  October  deadline?  More  to the point,  will  we be
able  to  draft  an  agreement  in  which  both  sides  will  come  out
winners-an  agreement  that stands  a  chance  of being  approved  in
both the United  States and Canada?
One thing that suggests  success is that there are strong pressures
for  a  free trade  agreement  in both  countries.  While  oftentimes the
opponents  seem to  get most  of the publicity, there  are many,  many
businesses on both sides of the border for which freer trade is essen-
tial for continued economic growth.
There  are  also  pressures  on  both  of  our  nations  from  outside
sources-in  particular  from  the  EC,  which  is  becoming  more  and
more protectionist, and from Pacific Rim countries, which are becom-
ing more and more  aggressive exporters.  European  and Pacific Rim
trade policies have heightened the importance  of the U.S. market for
Canada and the Canadian market for the United States.
The United  States and Canada already enjoy the largest bilateral
trade relationship  in the world.  For  agriculture,  Canada  is both  a
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ports from  Canada totaled nearly  $2  billion in  1986 and Canadian
imports from the United States totaled $2.4 billion.
Canada consistently ranks as the fifth or sixth largest U.S. agricul-
tural customer.  It is our biggest foreign buyer of a number of high-
value products such as oranges and orange juice, fresh grapes, fresh
tomatoes, lettuce and nursery stock and flowers. About 70 percent  of
U.S. agricultural  exports to Canada  is comprised  of more than  100
products  with a relatively  small export value-less than $40 million
annually.
Canada  also is  one  of our foremost  competitors  in third country
agricultural  markets,  with nearly  three-fourths  of its exports  des-
tined for countries other than the United States. Besides being our
No.  1 rival in world  wheat  markets, especially  for spring varieties
and  durum,  Canada  also is a  major competitor  in barley,  oilseeds,
horticultural and livestock items.
Canada is the United States'  largest supplier  of competitive  agri-
cultural  products.  Frozen  pork,  beef  and  veal plus  live  cattle  and
hogs head the list at nearly  $1  billion. Other significant  Canadian
exports to the United States include  horticultural  items and grain
products.  Some  of Canada's  most important  exports  to  the United
States are commodities for which it has few alternative markets-for
example, live hogs and fresh potatoes.
U.S.-Canadian  free  trade  talks  are  also  significant  because  they
offer both our countries an opportunity to get a head start on issues
that will undoubtedly  be addressed  in the multilateral  forum of the
Uruguay Round.
The Uruguay  Round of multilateral  trade negotiations represents
the best opportunity U.S. and Canadian agriculture will have in this
decade, and possibly for the rest of the century, for developing ground
rules that will facilitate  expanded trade.
If the United States and Canada-both of which have highly devel-
oped agricultural systems and a big stake in freer and fairer agricul-
tural  trade-can  find  ways  to  resolve  the  issues  that  trouble  our
trade,  our chance  for  success  in the Uruguay Round will  be greatly
improved.
Our achievements  in these bilateral talks may well be perceived as
a test of whether progress in resolving agricultural  trade disputes  is
possible in the multilateral  GATT forum.
Conclusion
I am optimistic about success in our talks with the Canadians and
in our negotiations with our Uruguay  Round partners,  provided  we
set ourselves the right goals.
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trade,  which  is  a two-way  street,  we  have  set  ourselves  the wrong
goal and I suspect both exercises  are doomed to fail.
If, however, our goal is to create  a trade environment wherein this
country and all other countries can compete fairly,  then  I think we
are aiming at the right goal and we have a real chance to succeed.
That is the outcome that  U.S.  agriculture,  and world agriculture,
needs.
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